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On January 16, 2016, US and coalition aircraft bombed nine cash storage locations used by
the Islamic State or Daesh in Iraq and Syria. A video of one of these attacks in Mosul, Iraq,
released by the US Department of Defense shows thousands of pieces of paper – bits of
currency – fluttering in the air after two 2,000-pound bombs were detonated (see Starr and
Diaz, 2016). Over twenty such attacks were carried out in an attempt to choke Islamic State
finance and revenue and hence its capabilities (Schmitt, 2016). The Department of Defense
has indicated that hundreds of millions of dollars were blown-up, although it is not clear what
currencies were destroyed.
Military power has long been used to destroy ‘enemy’ resources and infrastructure, and in
this sense the targeting of banks is not new, even though the cash itself has less usually been
an explicit target. Yet the focus on cash speaks to the centrality of money and finance to
contemporary military imaginaries, strategies and objectives. Indeed, money is not only being
targeted in war, it is also being deployed as a weapon, while militaries themselves are taking
on more and more financial and economic responsibilities as part of combat (Gilbert, 2015a).
In this short essay I point to ways that militaries – especially the US military – are focused on
money and economics, and address what this means for understanding the entanglements of
security and finance. This builds upon but expands the groundbreaking work of Marieke de
Goede, which has helped to better understand both the securitization of finance and the
financialization of security, ranging from an examination of the intersecting logics of these
domains and their orientation to an uncertain future, to the ways that states deploy economics
for security ends, to the (in)securities that are created in and through finance (de Goede,
2010). Yet it also points to some gaps in existing research on the finance-security nexus, which
largely ignores the role of militaries and military power.
Understanding militarized financial security is increasingly necessary, for as I have
examined elsewhere, in the twenty-first century militaries are adopting a doctrine of money as
a ‘weapons system’ whereby spending money is seen as a ‘force multiplier’ that saves the lives
of coalition forces by ingratiating the military to noncombatants (Gilbert, 2015a). This includes
battalion spending on infrastructure development such as roads, electricity, sewage, and
schools; job creation programs or micro-loans and the support of local businesses and
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damage incurred against civilians (Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b). As the military has shifted to
embrace Stability Operations as core to its objectives, these financial strategies – and
especially the push towards reconstruction – have been folded into the military’s combat role,
rather than seen as subsequent or a supplement to it (Taw, 2012). Under the doctrine of
Stability Operations, the military’s objective is as much about providing support to populations
as about attacking perceived threats, so that investment and destruction operate hand-in-
hand.
Attending to the military’s take-up of money is important for understanding a different
dimension of “the instrumental deployment of financial instruments in the service of national
security and foreign policy” (de Goede, 2010: 101). It sheds further light on how “Finance is
security’s economic double” in that they are so intertwined historically and conceptually that it
“make[s] the one unthinkable without the other in modernity” (de Goede, 2010: 106). As de
Goede and others such as Randy Martin (2007) have illustrated, one aspect of this mutuality
is the way that finance and security are oriented towards taming uncertain futures. This ethos
has migrated over to militarized finance, especially with the move away from a ‘money as a
weapon’s system’ agenda towards the targeting of ‘counter threat finance’. As I will illustrate
below, the military is now adopting financial risk imaginaries that are central to counter-
terrorism financing, as de Goede has examined extensively in her other work (e.g., de Goede,
2012).
In August 2010, ‘Counter threat finance’ was established as a Department of Defense
mission with the release of DoD Directive 5205.14 (DoD, 2010). The subsequently published
Commander’s Handbook for Counter Threat Finance explains that counter threat finance has
as its objective to “detect, identify, deny, destroy, defeat, contain, disrupt, exploit, deter, or
dismantle the collection, storage, transmission, distribution, and usage of currency, assets or
resources, which support state and non-state threats to US national security” (Joint Staff,
2011: I-7). Military intelligence is to be gleaned from suspicious activity reports by and of
financial institutions (as in the US’s FinCEN – the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of
the Department of Treasury). But military personnel are also tasked with information collection
through HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), OSINT (open source
intelligence), GEOINT (geospatial intelligence) and data collected from manned and unmanned
aircraft sensors. As detailed in the appendixes to the handbook, information is to be sought on
the financiers involved, to whom they are providing the money, but also how they are acquiring
it, whether through legal or illegal activities, from zakat or foreign donations to counterfeit
sales or drug trafficking. Other targeted groups are the facilitators who distribute the money,
through bank transfers or hawalas. And then there are the adversaries themselves: the
decision-makers regarding how money is allocated, and the shuras that govern this, as well as
the bookkeepers and accountants, and the couriers. The handbook advises that targeted
individuals may use the bank accounts of friends and family and so they too should be
monitored (Joint Staff, 2011: C-9). Flow charts are to be created to “follow the money” (Joint
Staff, 2011: v-2), from how it is acquired, circulated and spent, and with respect to almost
everything that generates revenue. Unusual behaviours or activities are also to be monitored,
such as “Remote control doorbells and garage door openers (when few people have garage
doors), remote controlled toys, repair parts such as washing machine timers when no one
uses electric washing machines, electrical supply stores when there is little electrical utility
support in the area” (Joint Staff, 2011: A-7).
Those who are familiar with de Goede’s analyses of counter terrorist financing will see
that there is much overlap between the military’s extensive protocols and the broader
campaign whereby banks and other financial institutions use client profiling to blacklist or
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freeze the assets of those who are suspected of supporting terrorism (see de Goede, 2012:
xxvii). Thus, to the counter-terror finance assemblages we can now add the military – an
otherwise overlooked player. Whereas the ‘money as a weapons system’ approach implicated
the military more intensely with the Department of State and US AID, the adoption of counter
threat finance has deepened the military’s connections with the Treasury Department, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the FBI and the IRS along with
banks and financial institutions. Under the Obama government a close working relationship
developed between the US Treasury, the military and other state agencies. Joint Threat
Finance Cells, working in conjunction between the Treasury and the military, for example, were
set up first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, with a “focus on recovering documents, gathering
financial data, and creating actionable intelligence necessary for the military to go after the
financial underbelly of the growing counterinsurgency” (Zarate, 2014: 196).
The implications for bringing the military into these finance-security assemblages, and
the dovetailing of tactics and techniques between ‘counter threat finance’ and counter-
terrorism financing are important to outline. As de Goede (2012) has illustrated at length,
when it comes to counter-terror financing, information derived from banking records and other
‘financial trails’ is made actionable in entirely speculative ways. Proximity or association with
suspect individuals or entities – or even having a name that is too similar to a suspect –
become grounds enough for blacklisting and asset freezing (de Goede, 2012: 157). The
application of intelligence is also anticipatory. The collection of financial data is used as part of
a “process of ‘connecting the dots’ of potential terrorists and plots before they strike” (de
Goede, 2008: 97; emphasis in original). The consequences are significant: blacklists or
sanctions entail a reduction in civil liberties such as “the right to dignity, freedom of
movement, the right to an income, to exercise an economic activity, etc” (Amicelle and Favarel-
Garrigues, 2012: 117).
With respect to military power, however, the outcomes of these same speculative
processes are invariably lethal. Indeed, at a banking conference, the Counter Threat Finance
Team Chief at US Special Operations Command, Kurt Gredzinski – himself a military veteran –
revealed that information supplied by banks was being used for military missions (Torbati and
Wolf, 2015). The Commander’s Handbook for Counter Threat Finance makes it clear that its
intelligence gathering is for engaging in military operations, ranging from interdiction to
capture/kill scenarios that may or may not include Special Operations Forces (Joint Staff,
2011: IV-12-13). This is not about using financial institutions or the criminal justice apparatus
– law and police – to stop terrorism financing, but using military power and lethal force.
Indeed, the threshold for ‘collateral damage’ is set higher, as these are considered to be ‘high-
value’ targets. As Army Steve Warren noted in a press briefing after the attacks on the Mosul
‘banks’ described at the beginning of this essay:
I will tell you, yes, we were prepared to accept civilian casualties in conjunction with the—with this cash
strike. It’s tragic, and it’s not something that we want to do. One of the burdens of command is to weigh the
military value of a target, versus the potential for civilian loss of life, and the potential for collateral damage.
(DoD, 2016)
Clearly in this case, the value of the cash stored was deemed to be worth more than the lives
of the civilians. In this, we see that finance can be violent not only in the ways that it is “the
form of capital accumulation symmetrical with new processes of value production” (Marazzi,
2010: 36; emphasis in original) that generate new forms of capital accumulation that
dispossess and devalue certain lives, but also because modern modes of finance are
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militarized to operate alongside and in conjunction with other forms of visceral violence and
accumulation.
The military turn to finance also has other potential outcomes. Access to information
about financial matters, perhaps especially around terrorism financing, is difficult to acquire.
Frank Pasquale (2015: 6) refers to the world of finance and algorithms as a “black box
society” which is mystified by privacy laws, hierarchical levels of authorization to access data,
and deliberate obfuscation – as with the offshore banking revealed through the Panama
papers. The secrecy that surrounds finance, he argues, was one of the conditions that enabled
the financial crisis (Pasquale, 2015: 15). Financial surveillance is especially clouded in
secrecy. As Kent Roach (2011: 51) observes, “Listing has always constituted a problematic
exercise because it fuses judicial, executive, and legislative powers in proclaiming a person to
be an international outlaw without advance notice or a hearing and often on the basis of
secret intelligence that is never publicly discloses”. But secrecy only intensifies when the
military is involved, as national security can be invoked to ensure that information remains
confidential, while access to information is limited by its hierarchical organizational structure.
This makes it especially hard to determine responsibility vis-à-vis any kind of collateral
damage. Furthermore, the military is notorious for being subject to less oversight – for
example, around surveillance – compared to the provisions usually in place in civilian sectors,
although recognizing that these forms of oversight are not always effective (Gilbert, 2015a).
Thus, the military’s turn to money and finance not only legitimize its broader role in society as
a vehicle for providing economic infrastructure, financial management and counter-terrorism
finance, it also perpetuates the inscrutability of finance and the difficulties of holding
individuals accountable “amid the complex human-technological assemblage” (de Goede,
2015: 356). Indeed, money is often used by the military precisely to disavow liability, by paying
up rather than being held accountable for its actions (Gilbert, 2015b).
Attending to the financialization of the military thus reveals a different dynamic to the
current entanglement of finance and security, but also pushes back against many mainstream
ideas about the rise of geoeconomics in the late twentieth century, and its separation from
military power (Blackwill and Harris, 2015). As de Goede (2011: 101) and others have pointed
out, the “instrumental deployment of financial instruments in the service of national security
and foreign policy” is not new. In the early twentieth century, the US adopted a program of
‘dollar diplomacy’ to leverage its interests through development programs (Rosenberg, 1999;
Duffield, 2007), while during the Cold War, financial sanctions and embargoes were regularly
used to target national economies, especially by the US, and not just against Russian
adversaries, but also against Britain and France in the case of the Suez Canal crisis, which
helped compel their withdrawal (Drezner, 2015). Notwithstanding this long history, many have
noted a shift, at least since the 1990s, whereby there is an increased turn to leveraging
finance to exert statecraft, from an explosion in sanctions, to the expansion of sanctions
beyond states, to the targeting of individuals and companies made possible through new
tracking technologies (Luttwak, 1990; O’Sullivan, 2003: 18). Juan C. Zarate, who was for a
time the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, has
described the post 9/11 moment as a ‘new era of financial warfare’ because of the US
Treasury’s turn to disruption financial through terrorism (Zarate, 2013; also Bracken, 2007).
What persists across these characterizations of the new turn to ‘geoeconomics’ or
‘financial warfare’ is their insistence that the finance-security nexus inherent to geoeconomics
is separate from military power. Blackwill and Harris (2016: 29), for example, suggest that
militaries and finance are separated by “a whole different set of social and normative
practices around the conduct of war” even while they might be mobilized at the same time
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(see also Rosenberg et al., 2016). Indeed, speaking in 2014, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew
submitted that financial warfare “opened up a new battlefield for the United States” which
“enables us to go after those who wish us harm without putting our troops in harm’s way or
using lethal force” (US Treasury, 2014: para. 18, emphasis added). While writing back in 1990,
Edward Luttwak suggested that the geoeconomic turn would in fact mitigate future need for
the military (Luttwak, 1990). But what I have sought to illustrate in this short essay is that this
notion of separate spheres is entirely false. Rather, alongside geoeconomics there is a
financialization of the military at play whereby the tools of counter-terrorism finance and
economic development (through the ‘money as a weapons system’ program) are being taken
on board as part of standard military operating procedures.
The financialization of security thus cannot be understood as outside military might. This
brings new insight to the work of de Goede and others who have laid the groundwork for
drawing together the critical insights of International Relations and International Political
Economy to apprehend the nexus of finance and security. As this work has exemplified, it is
only by grasping the insights across these multiple fields that the contemporary dynamics of
both the securitization of finance and the financialization of security come fully into view, as
well as the ways that these processes intersect and collide. Other disciplines have been slower
to engage in these questions, yet the opportunity to contribute to the analysis is imperative,
especially to broaden the debates away from understandings of security and economy in the
fields of politics. Geographers could do more to address these issues; at it is, they have
provided compelling analyses of both national security and finance, but rarely draw these
together, the work divvied up between political and economic geographers. More geographic
work on the site of the finance-security nexus, however, could bring a more focused spatial
critique to these discussions that is attuned to the situated and uneven forms of power that
are produced and reproduced in contemporary finance-security assemblages and how they are
constituted at various scales across the local and the global, the domestic and the
international (Gilbert et al., 2013).
This leads to a final invocation: as the military is taking on money and finance in more
and more direct ways, we need to better understand how war abroad is refracted onto
domestic politics, in what Michel Foucault (2003: 57) has postulated as “the war or struggle of
races”. Rather than neatly differentiating between the domestic and the international,
contemporary forms of security exist in a continuum that also blurs the commonplace
distinctions between war and crime, defence and public order (Bigo, 2008). We can see this in
the shifting forms of the securitization of finance, or the ways that the national economy has
been securitized. As de Goede (2010: 100) reminds us, during the 2008 presidential
campaign, President Barack Obama explicitly framed the credit crisis as a matter of national
security. Not long after, Admiral Michael Mullin, then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, insisted
that “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt”, arguing that the
country’s diminished resources would lead to a weakened military (Anon., 2010). Indeed, “the
language of war came to be used to understand the credit crisis”, through tropes such as
‘preemptive strikes’ – precisely the kinds of financial strategies that the military has itself
taken up (de Goede, 2010: 100). Thinking credit, debt and crisis through war provides an
opening for analyzing the relations of power that pervade the complex forms of securitization
that are being enacted. Along these lines, Ofelia O. Cuevas interrogates the links drawn by
President George W. Bush, less than a year after 9/11, when he observed that the “two
securities” – security from terrorism and economic security – “go hand in hand … Part of being
a secure America is to encourage homeownership” (quoted in Cuevas, 2012: 605). Cuevas
unpacks the violence around the ways that black and brown people were brought into the
185 Finance and Society 3(2)
housing market as “consumers of debt-as-community” to help stimulate the national economy,
but which ultimately gave rise to the real estate bubble (Cuevas, 2012: 615). When the bubble
burst, these ‘subprime’ lenders were disproportionately affected: nearly a quarter million
blacks lost their homes through foreclosure, with black savings wiped out (Taylor, 2016: 193).
Moral condemnation was unleashed against those who were unable to pay, who were
demonized for not paying their debts (Chakrabartty and da Silva, 2012), while those who were
in command of the financialized economy were not only not held accountable, but were bailed
out from the crisis.
This multi-disciplinary work – much of it from the humanities – not only attends to the
processes of racialization of the most recent financial crisis, and the insecurities that it
generated, but takes a longer historical view that ties the subprime crises of Europe and North
America in 2007, to the crises in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s
where we also see “lending to persons and nations precisely because they would not be able
to pay it back” (Chakrabartty and da Silva, 2012: 364; emphasis in original). Others have
traced contemporary financialization to deeper histories of slavery and slave insurance (Ralph,
2012; Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Goldstein, 2014; Kish and Leroy, 2015; Singh, 2016). The
insights from this work need to be better taken up in the work on the finance-security nexus so
as to identify the forms of empowerment and disempowerment that are mobilized and the
domestic and international colour lines that are enacted (Gilbert, 2010). This echoes with a
point made by de Goede, who argues that we need to “analyse the precise socio-cultural
histories of each phase of securitization” to see “which contingencies become commodified
and securitized at different moments in history”, so that we can determine who bears the
brunt of the insecurities that are created (de Goede, 2010: 104, 105). For as Charles
Dannreuther and Oliver Kessler (2017: 357) have argued, “Practices of risk assessment, the
identification, measuring and trading of risks, and the categorisation of risk and uncertainty
and their translation into numbers are not colour blind”. As militaries get into the business of
money and finance, it is even more imperative that we address both the social and political
stakes in the interplay of financial and security and attend to the racialized implications of
these practices, both domestically and abroad, as well as how they operate alongside other
forms of marginalization and dispossession. We cannot think about security in the
contemporary moment without also thinking about militaries and war, and it is only by
addressing how military power is entangled in geoeconomics, domestic politics and biopolitics
that can we better understand how insecurity is enacted, on whom, with what effects, and with
what implications.
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